

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Intelligence School ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DATE: 28 September 1960

FROM : Chief, Intelligence Production Faculty

SUBJECT: Weekly Activities Report No. 34
21 - 28 September 1960

I. SIGNIFICANT ITEMS

Nothing to report.

II. OTHER ACTIVITIES

- 25X1A9A 1. Two JOTs, [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] whether it would be possible for them to spend some time improving their writing during this week's break in their training. Despite the fact that the Writing Workshops program is now operating at full capacity, we felt that such initiative and willingness to work deserved recognition, so the two JOTs are now receiving special tutoring in writing. 25X1A9A
- 25X1A9A 2. The 16 students in the Basic Writing Workshop are working hard. Many of them have done substantial amounts of the optional homework suggested by the instructor. Two of the students in the Workshop are attending extra tutoring sessions, in order to finish the course this week. The students are [REDACTED] of the Comptroller's Office, who is to start the IO Course next week; and [REDACTED] of the DD/P, who is going on maternity leave next week. 25X1A9A
- 25X1A9A 3. Mr. [REDACTED] has edited 8 summaries of lectures which will be used by the Intelligence Orientation Faculty in a course they are planning.
4. In the present running of Intelligence Research (Techniques) the penalty for lack of necessary knowledge about the DD/P and its operations has been made quite clear. In the past OSI and ORR analysts have generally cooperated whenever the DD/P sent out a Notice of Intelligence Potential by responding with collection requirements. This response has been based not only on the

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desire of the analyst to cooperate with DD/P, but also, in many cases, on the feeling that, although the NIP might not deal with priority areas or subjects, it would help DD/P maintain and increase its skills until it could collect on priority areas or subjects. Now, however, OSI has developed a firm policy of not submitting any requirements to DD/P except on Priority One intelligence objectives, and only if they deal with the USSR. It feels that the past policy resulted in DD/P concentrating on things it could collect, rather than concentrating on those it should collect. On its side, DD/P apparently felt it was doing well because it was receiving requirements from analysts (in response to the NIPs, and analyst-initiated) on nonpriority areas and subjects and was responding satisfactorily to them. F

III. PERSONNEL

1. Mr. [REDACTED] is on annual leave for two weeks.
2. Mr. [REDACTED] on sick leave on 27 and 28 September.

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This is a by-product of the alleged DD/P failure to collect S + T information.

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